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Recent Developments 
In re Thomas J.: 
Juveniles Have a Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial Under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights 
I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held juveniles have a 
constitutional right to a speedy trial 
under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article 
21 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. In re Thomas, 372 Md. 50, 
811 A.2d 310 (2002). The court 
further held when applying the 
Barker test delays due to the State's 
negligence are weighed against the 
State. Id. at 76, 811 A.2d at 326. 
In 1996, Thomas J. 
("Thomas"), then fourteen years old, 
was arrested for attempted robbery 
and later released to his mother 
("Mrs. 1.") after she signed a release 
requiring her to notify the court if she 
or Thomas moved. The court 
issued a writ of attachment following 
three unsuccessful attempts to serve 
a summons because Thomas 
moved. The writ was returned 
when Thomas was seventeen. 
Thomas filed a preliminary 
motion to dismiss in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George's County 
on grounds he was denied a speedy 
trial. The juvenile court denied the 
motion. Thomas appealed and the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland reversed the judgment. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to address the 
issue of first impression, whether the 
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constitutional right to a speedy trial 
applies to juvenile proceedings. 
The court's analysis began with 
a review of a juvenile's right to a 
speedy trial. The court noted the 
United States Supreme Court has 
been reluctant to bestow all rights 
constitutionally assured to adults in 
criminal proceedings to state juvenile 
proceedings. Id. at 58, 811 A.2d 
at 315. The court determined that 
relief must arise from a violation of 
[Thomas '] due process rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
Rights guaranteed to Maryland 
adult criminal defendants are not 
guaranteed in juvenile proceedings. 
Id. Rather than incorporate all 
"adult" rights to juveniles, the court 
of appeals approaches juvenile 
rights in criminal prosecutions on a 
"right-by-right" basis. Id. 
Maryland Rule 11-114(b)( 1) 
protects juveniles against delayed 
proceedings when they are detained 
and not given an adjudicatory 
hearing within thirty days of court 
ordered detention, or not detained 
and not given an adjudicatory 
hearing within sixty days after they 
are served with the petition. In re 
Thomas, 372 Md. at 61,811 A.2d 
at 316-317. The court concluded 
Rule 11-114(b)( 1) failed to protect 
Thomas from substantial delay 
because he was not detained and 
recei ved the petition three years 
and four months after his arrest. Id. 
at 60, 811 A.2d at 316. 
Next, the court looked to the 
Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article 
21 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. Id. at 61,811 A.2d at 317. 
The court based its federal 
constitutional analysis on the 
"essentials of due process and fair 
treatment" established by the 
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 
U.S.'1 (1967). Id. at 64-65,811 
A.2d at 319. 
Noting that neither the 
Supreme Court nor the court of 
appeals had considered ajuvenile's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, 
the court cited other jurisdictions 
where the right to a speedy trial is 
extended to youthful offenders in 
juvenile proceedings. Id. at 66-67, 
811 A.2d at 319-320. The court 
held, "as a matter of fundamental 
fairness," juveniles have a right to 
a speedy trial under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Article 21 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights 
because speedy trials safeguard the 
fact-finding process. Id. at 70, 811 
A.2d at 322. However, the court 
declined to establish a specific 
length of delay that would violate 
this right. In re Thomas, 372 Md. 
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at 70, 811 A.2d at 322. 
The court relied on case law 
and the Supreme Court's four-part 
balancing test established in Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), 
subsequently adopted by the court 
in Divver, to determine whether 
Thomas' right to a speedy trial was 
violated. Id at 72,811 A.2d at 323; 
See Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379 
(1999). The Barker factors include 
1) the length of delay; 2) the reason 
for the delay; 3) the accused's 
assertion of the right to a speedy 
trial; and 4) whether the accused 
was prejudiced by the delay. Id at 
72,811 A.2d at 323. 
Beginning with the Barker 
analysis, the court stated length of 
delay "is a triggering mechanism and 
is not necessarily ... sufficient to 
compel dismissal." Id at 73, 811 
A.2d at 324. In Divver, the court 
held length of delay "is measured 
from the date of arrest or filing of 
indictment, information, or other 
formal charges to the date oftrial." 
Id Thomas' date of arrest was 
January 18, 1996 and the writ was 
returned on April 22, 1999, a delay 
of three years and four months. Id 
The court found the delay sufficient 
enough to raise a presumption of 
prejudice and compel the court to 
consider the remaining three Barker 
factors. In re Thomas, 372 Md. at 
73, 811 A.2d at 324. 
Next, the court considered the 
reason for the delay. Id at 74, 811 
A.2d at 324. Finding no evidence 
the State intended to hamper 
Thomas' defense, or that Mrs. J. 
intended to elude the juvenile 
proceedings by moving, the court 
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opined the State is obligated to 
make a reasonable attempt to locate 
alleged delinquents. Id at 75, 811 
A.2d at 325. Mrs. J. "reasonably 
kept in contact" with authorities and 
the State merely relied upon a writ, 
causing the court to weigh the delay 
against the State due to the State's 
negligence. Id at 76, 811 A.2d at 326. 
Whether an accused asserted 
a right to a speedy trial is the third 
Barker factor. Id at 76,811 A.2d 
at 326. Thomas did not assert his 
right to a speedy trial. Id. However, 
in Brady v. State, 288 Md. 61 
(1980), the court held when a 
defendant is unaware of a charge, a 
failure to demand a speedy trial 
cannot be weighed against him. In 
re Thomas, 372 Md. at 76, 811 
A.2d at 326. Therefore, because 
Thomas did not know about the 
delinquency petition, the court did 
not weigh this factor against him. Id 
at 76, 811 A.2d at 326. 
Concluding its analysis, the 
court analyzed the fourth Barker 
factor -- prejudice to the accused. 
Id. at 77, 811 A.2d at 326. 
Prejudice is assessed in light ofthree 
interests established in Barker to 
protect the constitutional right to a 
speedy trial. The interests include: 
1) prevention of oppressive pretrial 
incarceration; 2) minimization of 
anxiety and concern of the accused; 
and 3) limitation of the possibility 
that the defense will be impaired. 
Id at 77,811 A.2d at 326. 
The court determined Thomas 
was not oppressively incarcerated. 
Id The court further determined 
Thomas did not state with parti-
cularity a claim of anxiety or con-
cern. Id at 78, 811 A.2d at 327. 
However, the court opined the State 
failed to meet its goal to minimize 
the time between Thomas' arrest and 
disposition to prevent anxiety and 
psychological harm. In re Thomas, 
372 Md. at 78, 811 A.2d at 327. 
Although not dispositive, the court 
concluded Thomas was neither anx-
ious nor concerned. Id at 78, 811 
A.2d at 327. 
In assessing prejudice to the 
accused, the court stated, "it speaks 
more to a presumed prejudice" 
because actual prejudice is difficult 
to prove. Id The court also stated 
substantial delays give rise to a pre-
sumption of prejudice. Id at 79, 
811 A.2d at 327. The importance 
of prejudice increases with the 
length of delay. Id at 80, 811 A.2d 
at 328(quoting Doggett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992)). The 
court held the three year and four 
month delay presumptively 
prejudicial and concluded that 
Thomas's constitutional due process 
and speedy trial rights were violated. 
Id at 80, 811 A.2d at 328. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland joined other jurisdictions 
in recognizing, as a matter of 
fundamental fairness, juvenile's 
rights to a speedy trial. This 
constitutional right, combined with 
protections provided by Maryland 
Rule 11-114(b)(1), will insure that 
youthful offenders are not unfairly 
prejudiced by substantial delays. 
The onus is now upon Maryland's 
juvenile justice system to fashion 
appropriate measures to prevent 
violations of Maryland juveniles' 
rights to a speedy trial. 
